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I.
My cryptic title may have led you to imagine that I will be talking about
Guantanamo Bay, or about the 'extraordinary rendition' of people kidnapped by the
CIA or M15 to 'dark sites' in Uzbekistan or Algeria, or about the summary
execution by special forces or by drones of undesirables in Pakistan or Syria, or
perhaps - less in the news, but even more on the rise - about 'export-processing
zones' in such places as Guatemala and the Philippines, where the police and even
the courts often have no writ. These are all places that are made deliberately and
officially lawless, places where regimes otherwise purporting to govern by law
remove all recourse to law in the name of getting political or economic results. The
rise of such legal black holes is certainly symptomatic of a troubling turn in the
relationship between government and law, a turn in which it is openly conceded by
government that it is only a fair-weather friend to due process of law, and in which
official talk of 'upholding the rule of law', let alone 'exporting the rule of law',
seems increasingly hypocritical, and yet also increasingly shameless in its
hypocrisy.
These developments are not totally unrelated to what I want to discuss here.
But I will come to that later. I want to begin by discussing what you may regard, on
first encounter, as a kind of countertendency. It is the tendency known as
'juridification', the proliferation of regulation by law and through law, both the
growing volume of such regulation and the way in which it is insinuated into ever
more comers of our lives. Habermas calls it a 'colonization of the lifeworld' by
law.' I believe, like Habermas, that it is a real and ongoing process in many parts of
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the world today. It creates all sorts of new work for lawyers, even in these
economically straitened times. Yet I will suggest, in the end, that it also heralds a
deprofessionalization of the legal profession. In all of the sociological aspects of
these matters - in persuading you that juridification is a real and ongoing process,
and in predicting where it is leading for the legal profession, and so forth - I am
but a keen and reasonably informed amateur. My only claim to have a professional
contribution to make to the study of the subject is through the various philosophical
puzzles that it raises. So, let me use amateur sociology - more charitably
characterized as a capacity for critical observation of cultural change - as a vehicle
for introducing and tackling some relevant philosophical puzzles, in the hope that
the solution to them might in turn help with critical observation, and even with
sociological research.
The philosophical puzzle that will interest me most is the one that gives my
paper its title. Juridification is steadily, perhaps unstoppably, on the rise. Yet
legality, it seems to me, is in equally steady decline. How is it possible for those two
propositions both to be true? I will try to show you how it is possible by showing
you how the two truths are related: how the truth of the first helps to explain the
truth of the second. Juridification, I will suggest, can become the enemy of legality.
And in the same way, by the same token, more work for lawyers can herald the
decline of the legal profession. Or so I will ultimately suggest.
II.
Let me begin with the simplest way in which juridification can become, and to my
mind has become, the enemy of legality.
Modem governments, their hands increasingly tied by the robber-barons of
global finance, often try to assert their power with their feet: by kicking out at
another high-profile social problem, real or imagined, with another big policy
initiative. Usually they come up with an accompanying raft of new laws. Legislative
incontinence prevails. Not only is much of the legislation futile and even
counterproductive from the start, we are also left with ever more relics of now-
forgotten reforms. Between 1997 and 2006, for example, more than 3000 new
criminal offences were enacted for England and Wales, while only a tiny number
were repealed.2 In spite of promises from later governments to turn over a new leaf,
and maybe even to thin out the statute book, the trend towards throwing new laws at
every moral panic that hits the newspapers or social media continues apace, and
without much sign of official appetite for tidying up of the resulting statutory
flotsam. The criminal law of other jurisdictions appears to have fallen victim to
similarly wild legislative abandon. The Illinois criminal code, for example, grew
from 23,970 words in 1961 to 136,181 words in 2003, not counting a further
153,347 words covering felonies (never mind misdemeanours) that accumulated
2 Andrew Ashworth and Lucia Zedner, 'Defending the Criminal Law: Reflections on
the Changing Character of Crime, Procedure, and Sanctions' (2008) 2(1) Criminal
Law and Philosophy 21.
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outside the code.3 While growth in the number of offences may not be quite as
extreme as growth in the number of words, it must still be extreme.
Most of us escape the daily consequences of this massive but pathetic display
of legislative machismo only because the law is erratically enforced. This means
that in two distinct ways we are not living under the rule of law. First, there is so
much law, touching on so many aspects of our lives, that it would be impossible for
us to grasp it all, or to follow it even if we could grasp it. Even as a qualified lawyer
I can't keep up with the politicians in their impotent zeal to put a stop to things.
Every day, I am pretty sure, I commit some petty offences, maybe when I am riding
my bicycle or putting out the recycling bins or paying a babysitter. But of what the
offences are and how I commit them I am not so sure. It would take a
disproportionate amount of time and effort to find out, and it would be impossible to
remember what I found out anyway. So even I, legally trained, don't get to use the
law as a guide to staying on the right side of it, and even I, legally trained, am
increasingly vulnerable to being unexpectedly ambushed by its rules. Such potential
for ambush, which makes the law a poor guide for those who are trying to conform
to it, is anathema to the rule of law.
Second, as a consequence of the situation I just described, we increasingly
rely on petty officials such as tax inspectors and police officers to turn a blind eye to
some violations of the law while coming down hard on others. Since there is no way
that all this junk law could be enforced consistently, there is increasing pressure for
it to be enforced selectively, and increasing latitude for the selection to be done by
fear or favour. So big corporations with police-like security departments can enjoy
cosy relations with the police that are denied to those who inconveniently protest
against their corporate power. This kind of selectivity is also anathema to the rule of
law. Under the rule of law, it shouldn't be one law for the powerful and another for
the rest of us. Even News Corporation, the Murdoch media empire, was pursued in
the UK for its phone-hacking and similar wrongs only because they made the silly
mistake of upsetting some very big cheeses.4 You may say it was always thus. I
don't deny it. I only say that the huge expansion of legal regulation is part of what
props it up so effectively today. So much law means lots of extra openings to
enforce that same law unevenly, including for reasons that are dubious, shadowy, or
corrupt. That is not the rule of law but rather what Aristotle correctly placed in
opposition to it, namely the rule of man.
3 See Paul H Robinson and Michael T Cahill, 'Can a Model Penal Code Save the
States from Themselves?' (2003) 1(1) Ohio Journal of Criminal Law 169.
4 It led to the closure of the Sunday tabloid News of the World, the prosecution of
executives and journalists (R v Coulson [2013] EWCA Crim 1026) and the setting up
of the Leveson Inquiry: Sir Brian Leveson, An Inquiry into the Culture, Practices and
Ethics of the Press (November 2012).
5 Aristotle, Politics 1287al9-32. My remarks here may call to mind FA Hayek's
broadside against the administrative state in The Constitution of Liberty (1960) and
other writings. However, my complaint is far narrower than his. Mine extends only to
our escalating reliance on the discretionary powers of petty law-enforcement
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So now you can see one simple sense in which juridification can be the
enemy of legality. A proliferation of law, whether in quantity or in reach, can erode
a civilization's prospects of maintaining fidelity to the rule of law. The rule of law
is the ideal according to which it is the law that should rule. Some people (we might
call them 'law and order types') believe that we live under the rule of law only to
the extent that the general public obeys the law. On this view, civil unrest in
Ferguson or St Louis is at least as much of a threat to the rule of law as police
brutality in quelling it. This invites a defence of the police brutality (even if illegal)
in terms of the rule of law itself. Better a bit of rough justice from the cops, say the
law-and-order types, than a whole lot of burnt-out cars and looted shops. This is the
symmetrical interpretation of the ideal; it condones the authorities in meeting
illegality with illegality on a level playing field.
Bernard Williams once argued that a government that simply meets illegality
with illegality, or impunity with impunity, or abuse with abuse, or terror with terror,
fails in respect of what he calls the 'Basic Legitimation Demand'.6 I agree. Such a
government has, in Williams' words, 'become part of the problem'.7 Thinking along
these lines, I propose an asymmetrical interpretation of the ideal of the rule of law.8
On this interpretation, the rule of law sets up an unequal struggle between
officialdom and the rest of us. The law should be such that ordinary people can
obey it, whether or not they actually do. The rule of law is threatened when the law
becomes so arcane, so vast, so vague, or so all-pervading, that people can't
imaginably use it as a guide to staying on the right side of it, even when they are
highly motivated to be so guided. But the rule of law is also threatened, in a
different way, when people can't rely on the law to predict how officials will react
to their breaches of it. It follows that officials of the law, as distinct from ordinary
people, need to follow the law scrupulously for the rule of law to prevail. Their
disobedience - including their unscrupulous fear or favour in upholding the law -
is a threat to the rule of law in a way in which, or to an extent to which, ordinary
law-breaking by you or me is not. In other words, officials of the law have an
obligation to obey the law that most of us don't have. That is because, as officials of
the law, they have an obligation to uphold the rule of law that the rest of us don't
have. We are the beneficiaries of the rule of law; they, when in official capacity, are
its functionaries. We should generally laugh at stupid laws. They, poor things,
should generally uphold them.
This asymmetry creates an intriguing moral problem for the law, especially
but not only the criminal law. On many occasions police officers, prosecutors,
officials. Not all public officials are petty law-enforcement officials. As later sections
will reveal, I have little sympathy for Hayek's wider faith in private powers over
public ones.
6 Bernard Williams, In the Beginning Was the Deed: Realism and Moralism in
Political Argument (2005) 3-9.
7~ Ibid 4.
For more elaboration of the asymmetrical interpretation of the ideal, see my Law as a
Leap ofFaith (2011) ch 8.
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lawyers, and judges have a moral obligation to call me to account for breaking a law
which, as they well know, I had no moral obligation to obey. I will not pursue the
interesting implications of that claim here. 9 To some it sounds like a contradiction;
but not to me. Here I want to concentrate on a different thesis that sounds like a
contradiction to some, but not to me. Some say that there is no law without legality,
meaning that there is no law without substantial compliance with the ideal of the
rule of law. Ronald Dworkin decries the opposite view as nonsensical. 0 But it is far
from nonsensical. It is a mundane reality that colours much of life today. The
growth of law, I have suggested, eventually threatens the rule of law in two key
ways: first, by impeding our ability to avoid falling foul of the law by following it;
second, by necessitating vast and inevitably unreliable official discretion in
upholding the law. Juridification is at that point, and to that extent, the enemy of
legality
III.
So far I have treated juridification as the proliferation of law. But the story of
juridification does not end there. For it is part of the nature of a legal system to be
(what is sometimes called) an 'open system'." It gives effect within the system to
norms that are not norms of the system. The most obvious examples are norms of
other legal systems which are recognized for various purposes, eg, in determining
the validity of a foreign marriage, or in assisting with the enforcement of a foreign
court judgment.
These are the most obvious examples, but they are not the most common
ones. The most common examples are the norms contained in contracts. These are
given extensive effect, in most legal systems, through a law of contract or
equivalent. So common is this technique that we sometimes talk as if the contracts
themselves are a legal invention and the norms in them are all creations of the law.
But contracts, and similar things like disclaimers and waivers, exist apart from the
law. They are created by the parties to them. What the law does is to give legal
effect to them, albeit within certain limits and on certain conditions. These days,
this is probably the most socially important way in which legal effect extends
beyond the norms of the law itself. And by this route the ever-growing role of
contracts, disclaimers, waivers and such like in our lives forms a big part of the
process of juridification. Juridification lies not only in the tide of law itself but the
9 I discuss some of them in 'Relations of Responsibility' in Rowan Cruft, Matthew
Kramer and Mark Reiff (eds), Crime, Punishment, and Responsibility: The
Jurisprudence of Antony Duff (2011), and others in 'Criminals in Uniform' in RA
Duff et al (eds), The Constitution of the Criminal Law (2013).
10 Ronald Dworkin, 'Hart's Postscript and the Character of Political Philosophy' (2004)
24(1) Oxford Journal ofLegal Studies 1, 25.
" The label comes from Joseph Raz, Practical Reason and Norms (1972) 152-4.
Following Raz, we now part company with Habermas, who adopted Luhmann's
picture of law as a closed ('autonomous') system and thereby underestimated the
insidiousness of juridification: see Habermas, above n 1, 354.
5
(2018) 43 Australasian Journal of Legal Philosophy
tide of norms that are not law but that are created with the aim, or at least in the
knowledge, of their having some legal effect. Fewer and fewer people will do
anything with you (or for you or to you) free of a plethora of terms and conditions
drafted with legal effect in mind. And the click-through structure of internet
transactions now creates even less space than might once have existed to replace,
modify, or renegotiate the terms. They are take it or leave it.
Margaret Radin argues that such take-it-or-leave-it 'boilerplate' poses a
growing threat to the rule of law. She has many arguments to that effect, which I
find cumulatively compelling.1 2 But here I want to emphasize just one.13 It takes its
cue from the growing tendency of take-it-or-leave it boilerplate to oust the
jurisdiction of the courts in favour of compulsory arbitration of disputes arising
under the contract. The aim is not to remove the legal effect of the contract, for the
party who sets the boilerplate terms - let's call her the 'vendor' for short - wants
to reserve the legal right to pursue the other party - let's call him the 'purchaser'
- through the courts for payment or for return of goods not paid for. And it would
not be possible, in most legal systems, to remove the legal effect of the contract
respecting the purchaser's rights under it without simultaneously removing the legal
effect respecting the vendor's rights. So the optimal solution, from the point of view
of the vendor seeking effective immunity against suit, is to preserve the purchaser's
primary rights (regarding the vendor's performance of the contract) but to withdraw
the purchaser's secondary rights regarding the enforcement of those primary rights
through the courts, such that any dispute originating with the purchaser is diverted
into an arbitration scheme of the vendor's choosing.
When a legislature attempts to oust the jurisdiction of the courts respecting
the legality of actions by public authorities, courts generally do not allow the ouster
to take effect.' 4 True, they may well allow ouster of the first-instance trial
jurisdiction of the courts, where one existed, in favour of alternative dispute
resolution ('ADR') outside the courts, such as via an ombudsman scheme. But any
12 Margaret Jane Radin, Boilerplate: The Fine Print, Vanishing Rights, and the Rule of
Law (2013). Some of Radin's arguments emphasize the doubtfulness of the claim that
boilerplate transactions are voluntary on both sides and properly serve the ideal of
freedom of contract, or of freedom more generally. These arguments repay close
attention, but will not concern us here.
13 See ibid 130ff, and with some added detail and focus, Margaret Jane Radin,
'Boilerplate: A Threat to the Rule of Law?' in Lisa M Austin and Dennis Klimchuk
(eds), Private Law and the Rule of Law (2013). A similar critique, which has also
influenced what follows, is Judith Resnik, 'Diffusing Disputes: The Public in the
Private of Arbitration, the Private in Courts, and the Erasure of Rights' (2015) 124(8)
Yale Law Journal 2680.
14 Leading cases in common-law jurisdictions: in the UK, Anisminic v Foreign
Compensation Commission [1969] 2 AC 147; in Australia, R v Hickman, ex parte
Fox (1945) 70 CLR 598; in Canada, Crevier v Quebec [1981] 2 SCR 220. The
leading Federal US decision in United States v Erika Inc, 456 US 201 (1982) takes a
more relaxed line regarding ouster clauses, except where it is the constitutional
legality of acts by public authorities that is at issue.
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public law ADR procedure is typically subject to case-by-case judicial review at the
instance of either party for its compliance with the law, for its procedural propriety,
and for the rational intelligibility of its verdicts. Things tend to be different with
ADR procedures between private parties arising under contracts. Although in most
legal systems the jurisdiction of the courts cannot be ousted altogether, judicial
review of the decisions of contractually appointed arbitrators is usually available
only on much narrower grounds.15 The net effect is that the person subject to
compulsory arbitration - let's keep calling him the 'purchaser' - may well lose
the ability to check the arbitral award for compliance with the terms of the contract
according to their correct legal effect. Thus, there is extra latitude for legal error in
private law ADR beyond what would normally be permitted in public law ADR.
Why should this be so?
You may think that I already gave the best explanation. The ideal of the rule
of law is asymmetrical as between nonofficial compliance and official compliance
with law. We ordinary folk should laugh at stupid laws; officials, poor things, have
to uphold them. In fact, that is a bit of a simplification of what I said. I only claimed
that officials of the law have the duty to uphold the law that the rest of us don't
have. I am far from sure that every public authority with a complaints procedure, or
every complaints procedure for a public authority, falls under that description. Not
every public official, after all, is someone with the job of reacting to breaches of the
law, and my argument for the asymmetrical interpretation of the rule of law rested
on the importance of people's being able to rely on the law to predict how officials
of the law will react to their breaches of it.
But let me bracket that point here in order to emphasize another that strikes
me as much more important. The vendors who use take-it-or-leave it boilerplate,
and who impose their own arbitration schemes to the exclusion of the jurisdiction of
the courts, are not merely potential noncompliers with the law like you and me
when we are deciding where to park or whether to pay for our petrol. They are
potential noncompliers with a set of contractual norms for which they also seek the
special privilege of legal recognition. For reasons that I already gave, the vendor
still wants the contract to be legally binding. Why should the law oblige by
providing such legal recognition if the norms in the contract are not in turn
amenable to legal construction by a court? Why should the norms be given any
legal effect if the law does not get to determine what the legal effect is?
I am always amazed at the attitude of my libertarian friends who treat the
legal effect of contracts as so very different from other kinds of special perks that
15 Here English law is the main outlier: a right of appeal to the courts from an arbitrator
on a point of law is enshrined in the Arbitration Act 1996 (UK) s69. However, the
provision allows for contractual ouster of the right. On how this compares with the
rationing of review in other jurisdictions, see VV Veeder, 'On Reforming the English
Arbitration Act 1996?' in J Lowry and L Mistelis (eds), Commercial Law
Perspectives and Practice (2005). A notable blow for the finality of arbitrations in
the United States was struck by the Supreme Court in AT&T Mobility v Concepcion,
563 US 333 (2011).
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may be handed out by public authorities. Somehow public housing or public
transport is an interference in private orderings. Yet, the public recognition
(including enforceability) of contracts is not an interference in private orderings;
indeed, it would somehow be an interference in private orderings, my libertarian
friends suggest, not to give such public recognition to contracts.1 6 The logic of this
position escapes me. It is time we understood that public recognition and
enforcement of contracts through the law is a system of official support for a
particular ideology and for the particular people who profit from it. They are the
biggest welfare recipients of all, for they get the most generous and unquestioning
handout from the public sector in the form of extensive legal support (whether paid-
for or otherwise) for their specialized way of ordering things. Theirs is a
featherbedding no different in modality from the legal privileging of a particular
religion or a particular caste or a particular sexuality. We should stop imagining that
the ideology of contract should get that featherbedding entirely on its own terms.
Since it demands the law's generous assistance, contract should get that assistance
mainly on the law's terms - subject to the law's take-it-or-leave-it boilerplate, if
you like. And the law's terms should include full submission to the rule of law. That
means that any effect that the law gives to contractual norms should be an effect
that the law, through the courts, ultimately get to determine. And that implies, I
suggest, no ouster of the courts' final jurisdiction over questions of law arising
under the contract, including its legal construction, which is an integral part of the
determination of its legal effects.
You may think that I am making old-fashioned statist assumptions, imagining
that all these internet transactions that take place without regard to territorial
borders still take place within the old framework of state legal systems, to which
their norms are therefore subordinated. I am forgetting, you may say, that the new
order does not respect state boundaries. But I have not mentioned the state. If you
assumed that the legal systems I had in mind had to be state legal systems, that is
your problem, not mine. So far as I am concerned the contracts that contain this
take-it-or-leave-it boilerplate requiring vendor-specified final arbitration for all
purchaser complaints might purport to be made under Shari'a Law or under Canon
Law or under the law of some other non-territorial legal system. The point is only
that they are purportedly made under the law of some legal system and hence fall to
have their legal effect determined by the law of that legal system. As it happens,
most are purportedly made under the law of fairly well-established municipal legal
systems, such as the Law of England and Wales or the Law of New York State. We
can imagine a world in which the apron strings are cut and the contracts we make
with Facebook and Amazon are purportedly made only under Facebook's or
16 Isn't this claim essential to Robert Nozick's famous 'Wilt Chamberlain example' in
his Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974) 160-4? See GA Cohen, Self-Ownership,
Freedom and Equality (1995) 230-6. It is certainly essential to Ayn Rand's position
in The Virtue of Selfishness (1964) 129. Naturally Rand's view, like Nozick's, meets




Amazon's own jurisdiction. Then the question will arise of whether Facebook or
Amazon has established a legal system of its own. But that world is a long way
from our own. At this stage, Facebook and Amazon purport to bind us only by
contract, and continue to assert that the contract is intended to have its legal effect
in a legal system that is not Facebook's or Amazon's own legal system.
Only once these Leviathans begin to assert a generalized compulsory
authority over us, meaning authority irrespective of contract and therefore
irrespective of the recognition of what they do in a legal system that is not their
own, only then will we have arrived at a truly new order in which multinational
corporations are the successors to nation states, and inherit from them the moral
obligations of government. At that point (all else being equal) they themselves will
be directly bound by the ideal of the rule of law, and under that ideal will naturally
need to make provision for judicial review of their official decisions by an
independent judiciary, clear and open laws, fair procedures, impartial policing, and
so forth. Who knows how all that will work out? We have reason to doubt whether
it will work out well. If the current state of play is anything to go by, the ideal of
these multinational corporations is juridification without legality. They seek the
legal effect of their own normative schemes - their own boilerplate - without any
corresponding subjection of those schemes to the demands of the rule of law, and in
particular to the principle of open access to the courts for review, by an independent
judiciary, of purportedly authoritative applications of the norms contained in those
schemes. If they cite the importance of the rule of law - for example, the need to
cultivate respect for the rule of law in China or the Middle East - then they too are
shameless hypocrites. For they openly favour the evasion of the rule of law in
respect of how they treat their customers in their own terms and conditions.
The black holes of legality that are created by compulsory arbitration
schemes in take-it-or-leave-it boilerplate contracts are not exactly Guantanamo Bay.
Nor are they on a par with the 'export processing zones' in which, as Saskia Sassen
puts it, 'an actual piece of [national territory] becomes denationalized'.17 Yet, they
are in the same spectrum. And as more and more of the 'lifeworld' is colonized by
take-it-or-leave it boilerplate, expertly juridified in such a way as to be so far as
possible insulated from legality, our lives promise to be more and more like those of
the workers in the export processing zones. Perhaps only then, in the twilight of
legality, will we begin to value what we lost.
IV.
In taking a dim view of compulsory arbitration in consumer contracts, and similar
forms of ADR, I have no doubt exposed myself to ire from those who believe that
ADR provides greater access to justice. Courts are expensive and slow and difficult
for amateurs to work with. Well-qualified arbitrators, mediators and conciliators are
capable of greater agility in dispute resolution at lower cost and with better
comprehensibility. That is surely to the advantage of all, but especially to the
17 Saskia Sassen, Losing Control? Sovereignty in the Age of Globalization (1996) 8-9.
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advantage of those for whom going to court - at any rate, going to court with
effective legal representation - would be an unimaginable luxury or at least a
serious economic challenge. In mitigation of the charge that I do not care about
access to justice, I want to remind you that I did not attack arbitration or anything
else' as a first-instance dispute-resolution technique, even in take-it-or-leave-it
boilerplate contracts. What I attacked was the tendency to exclude judicial review of
arbitrations for errors of law, including errors of contractual construction, errors that
would be sufficient to warrant judicial review of public authority decisions. In
putting it that way, I am clearly leaving a hostage to fortune, for attempts to limit
judicial review even of public authorities (eg, by levying prohibitive up-front court
fees) are nothing new.19 As judicial review of public authorities becomes harder to
obtain, however, my critique only becomes more urgent. My claim is not that those
who exercise authority bestowed by contract should be subject to legality-review to
the same extent as those who exercise public authority. My claim is that both should
be subject to searching and accessible legality review.
The word 'accessible' here I also plead by way of mitigation in respect of the
charge that I care too little about access to justice. I am a noisy believer in nominal
court fees and a strong system of taxpayer-funded legal aid for private litigants that
is portable between lawyers and that therefore allows the poor to have access, by
and large, to the same lawyers as the rich.20 Until 2011 we had such a system in the
UK. 2 1 Its all-but-complete destruction on flimsy economic pretexts, by our present
government and the last is, I believe, only partly driven by lack of interest in the
poor and dispossessed. It is also driven by a privatizer's ideological contempt for
the rule of law. The principal aim is to drive many people away from the law, to
effectively deter and ultimately remove their recourse to courts and professional
lawyers across a large range of matters, and thereby to encourage the rise of a slick
and profitable new ADR industry which includes not only an advice and
representation function, but more importantly has the capacity to perform the
dispute-resolution function itself, formerly the work of the courts, on the open
market. For those who share this ideology, replacing the courts with private-sector
dispute-resolvers is just like removing the old state monopolies in
telecommunications and power generation, replacing them with lean new sectors
18 Including negotiated settlement of the dispute. I am sympathetic to Owen Fiss's
position in 'Against Settlement' (1984) 93(6) Yale Law Journal 1073 but my
argument here is in several respects more limited.
19 Owen Boycott, 'Plans to restrict judicial review face further concessions', The
Guardian (London), 13 January 2015. For some robust judicial pushback against
escalating court fees, on rule-of-law grounds akin to those advanced here, see R v
Lord Chancellor; ex parte Unison [2017] UKSC 51, especially [66]-[102].
20 Fred Wilmot-Smith's forthcoming book Just Justice captures many of my views and
expresses them more powerfully than I ever could. For tasters, see his 'Necessity or
Ideology?', London Review of Books, 6 November 2014, and 'Court Cuts', London
Review ofBooks, 30 July 2015.
21 Although there had been significant curtailments and cuts before then: see Sir Henry
Brooke, 'The History of Legal Aid 1945-2010' in Bach Commission, The Right to
Justice, Final Report (14 December 2017) appendix 6.
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rife with competition and thereby providing, so the ideological narrative goes, a
better service for the consumer. Law itself is the final frontier in the wider quest for
deregulation in favour of the discipline of the market. (And in case anyone dissents
before we reach that frontier, the muscular pioneers of anarcho-capitalism will tell
you: no point resisting; it is coming anyway; there will soon be an app for dispute
resolution. Tech-determinism is today the favoured way of making those who still
believe in the rule of law look like they are going to be on the wrong side of history.
Uber, for example, has notoriously favoured that line: the rule of law is so
yesterday; 22 Uber is the unstoppable future. 23)
You can see here one reason why I might be inclined to think that those who
associate ADR with access to justice are barking up the wrong tree. They are
thereby joining forces with many who do not really care about access to justice at
all but only care about a profitable new business opening, in which any noble plan
for widening access to justice will ultimately stand or fall on the profitability or
unprofitability of its implementation. But I don't want to rest my case on that bleak
observation, which could equally be made, mutatis mutandis, about almost every
development in western progressive politics since 1979. Instead, I want to return to
my proper philosophical task by saying a little about the idea, implicit in the
foregoing remarks, that access to the courts is all about dispute-resolution. I do not
deny, of course, that dispute resolution is an important function of the courts. But as
the parable of Solomon is supposed to remind us, facility in resolving disputes is not
enough to make an institution into a court of law. There are different ways to
resolve disputes and courts exist to resolve disputes in a particular way, viz, by
doing justice between the parties according to law.
It is very important to hear all three parts of this: the 'justice' part, the
'between the parties' part, and the 'according to law' part. For it is very tempting to
think that so long as the dispute is resolved justly as between the parties, we
shouldn't care whether it is resolved according to law or not. Hence, the phrase
access to justice', which makes it sound as if whether what is done is done
according to law is of no independent importance. Its importance lies only in its role
as a mechanism for doing justice between the parties. If justice between the parties
could be done to the same degree either with law or without law, on this view, we
should be indifferent as between the two ways of doing it. So the case for law has to
be made, on this view, by showing that justice cannot be done to the same degree
without law as with it.
This is a very hard case to make. Some people have tried to make it by
arguing that there is an extra kind of justice - legal justice - that one does by
22 Eric Newcomer, 'Uber Pushed the Limits of the Law. Now Comes the Reckoning',
Bloomberg Technology (online), 11 October 2017
<https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2017-10-1 1/uber-pushed-the-limits-of-
the-law-now-comes-the-reckoning>.
23 Jon Axworthy, 'Cab wars: the Unstoppable Rise of Uber', Shortlist (online), 16 July
2015 <https://www.shortlist.com/instant-improver/cab-wars/61881>.
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virtue of the fact that one is applying the law.24 Since this is an extra kind of justice
found distinctively in the legal process, justice done according to law is more just,
all else being equal, than justice done in other ways. Justice done according to law
is justice plus extra justice.
There are numerous problems with this view. For present purposes, allow me
to focus on just one of them.
As I have just explained it, the view equates justice done according to law
with justice done by merely applying the law. But the two are not equivalent.
Judges who take an oath to do justice according to law do not thereby bind
themselves to do justice by merely applying the law. That would be a daft thing for
anyone to bind herself to do since across a large number of cases it is impossible to
do justice by merely applying the law, for the simple reason that the law is often
unjust and cannot be justly applied. This point was most famously made, and most
ably defended, by David Lyons.25 The only way to do justice with an unjust law is
to modify the law to make it more just. When the judge takes an oath to do justice
according to law, she binds herself to do justice first and foremost, and to modify
the law as she goes along to make it possible to do justice. The words 'according to
law' are there to determine how - under what constraints - she modifies the law
to make it more just. I have argued elsewhere that the most important constraint for
judges is this one: judges must make their rulings regarding particular cases, and
hence between particular parties, on the footing that the ruling is an application of a
legal rule, and that the rule in the case, even if it has just been created to resolve the
case, could in principle be reapplied in future.26 That makes it a breach of her oath
for a judge to separate the rule from the ruling either by declaring what the rule is
(or will henceforth be) while declining to apply it now; or by denying that there is a
rule (or, in other words, claiming that the case under decision is being decided only
'on its particular facts'). These are also demands of the rule of law, which is the
main reason why judges take an oath to submit to them: they are what distinguish
the rule of law from the rule of man in the business of doing justice between the
parties. And they are also, I suggest, the main things that distinguish adjudication
before a court of law from arbitration. In arbitration, there is no similar constraint:
there is no requirement that the arbitrator must treat the ruling as the application of a
rule, even a rule of his or her own making. The arbitrator is free simply to arbitrate
this case on its particular facts only. That is not to say that he or she is not bound by
law. If the arbitrator were not bound by law, everything I said about the need for
him or her to be judicially reviewable would be unintelligible. No, it is only to say
that the arbitrator is not bound by the ideal of the rule of law in the way that the
judge is bound by the ideal of the rule of law. It is not the arbitrator's task to make
his or her ruling on the footing that it exemplifies a legal rule.
24 Notably, HLA Hart in The Concept ofLaw (1961) 202.
25 David Lyons, 'On Formal Justice' (1973) 58(5) Cornell Law Review 833; David
Lyons 'Formal Justice and Judicial Precedent' (1985) 38(3) Vanderbilt Law Review
495.
26 Gardner, above n 8, ch 8.
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If I have all this right, then the difference between judges and arbitrators is
not that judges get to do more or better justice between the parties than arbitrators
do. It is possible, indeed, that arbitration is capable of doing a more perfect justice
between the parties than adjudication in court. For in the hands of a morally suitable
arbitrator - unlike in court - justice can done between the parties entirely
uninhibited by the constraint of legality that I have just sketched. In arbitration,
perhaps, a more perfect equity can in principle be achieved. So the constraint of
legality, it seems to me, does not add any extra justice between the parties, or any
extra justice full stop. What it adds, rather, is a dash of legality. Making the case for
adjudication in court, then, means making a case for legality as well as justice
between the parties, or in other words making a case for legality that does not
depend on any necessary contribution that the serving of legality makes to the doing
of justice between the parties (or to justice at all).
That, it seems to me, is less of a tall order. The work of judges contributes to
the law and to keeping the law in good legal order, ie, in conformity with the rule of
law. It thereby contributes to serving the law's primary function. The law's primary
function is not to resolve disputes, nor (therefore) to do justice between the parties
to those disputes. The law's primary function is to guide us in what we do, whether
we are in disputes or not, and that includes to guide us in such a way as to avoid
disputes, and hence to avoid the need for justice to be done between us. The doing
of justice between the parties in resolving their disputes is a secondary function in
case the primary one fails.2 7 The point of justice being done according to law, then,
is that the performance of the secondary function must also assist with the primary.
It must also provide guidance. Whereas the doing of justice between the parties can
be conceptualized - a little unfortunately, I think - as a service mainly to those
parties, the providing of guidance by bringing their case under a rule cannot readily
be so conceptualized. It is mainly a public good. It is therefore subject to the
perennial problem of the market undervaluation of public goods. The parties
understandably prefer not to pay for it. If they could get the same quality of justice
dispensed between them cheaper, without the need for them to bear the extra costs
of its being done according to law, they would naturally be tempted to do so.
Arbitration, especially when freed of the yoke of subjection to judicial
review, is capable of reducing and even eliminating these costs. Thus, it can be
cheaper for the parties. But it may be expensive for the rest of us, for the world at
large, because the growth of arbitration as a rival system for dispute resolution
threatens to erode the ability of the judicial process to play its role, its public-good
role, in maintaining the law in good order, and in particular in maintaining the
prominence and authority of the law as a system for guiding what we do when we
are not in dispute. Cheap justice, even when it is good justice, is a potential enemy
of the rule of law. The rule of law is a public good. To avoid undersupply of that
27 Cf Joseph Raz, 'The Functions of Law' in AWB Simpson (ed), Oxford Essays in
Jurisprudence: Second Series (1973), who proposes that the dispute-resolving
function is a primary one if and only if the dispute is legally unregulated prior to the
point of dispute-resolution.
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public good we should provide access to justice by making access to courts of law
cheaper by publicly subsidizing them, and not, or at any rate not only, by diverting
people to (as it were) organically cheaper alternatives.
There's a gap, of course, between supporting the public good of the rule of
law by enabling access to the courts, and supporting it by giving everyone a right of
access to the courts in the way that my earlier remarks on judicial review envisaged.
To fill that gap we'd need to think about efficacy: about whether giving people a
right of access to the courts is an effective way to support the public good. And
when we think about that, we'd need to be astute to what I earlier called the
asymmetry of the rule of law. Under the rule of law, we should all be able to be
guided by the law, whether we are in fact guided by it or not. But some people
should actually be guided by the law. Those are the people who try to hold the rest
of us to the law, including officials of the law as well as private contracting parties.
In deciding whether a right of access to the law is efficacious as a way of supporting
the rule of law, we need to think not only about the help that the courts give all of us
with understanding the law, via our lawyers or otherwise, but also, and more
importantly, about the ability that a right of access to the courts can give us to hold
officials of the law and other would-be law-upholders to the strictest standards of
the law. If access to the courts is not by right, then the accountability of such people
to the law is rendered less potent. They run less risk of being tested by random
people who come at them out of nowhere. That is a relief to them, but it is bad news
for the rule of law. That one could in principle be held to account in court by just
about anyone, and that one does not know when it might happen or at whose
instance, is a demanding discipline. You may protest that it is an ambush, and hence
(as I put it before) anathema to the rule of law. It is not, however, an ambush by the
law. The relevant law may be perfectly clear and easy to follow. The question is
whether the powers-that-be have sufficient incentive to abide by it. Giving all a
right of access to the courts, complete with affordability, is a possible way to ensure
that they do. So it is not surprising that the powers-that-be that wish to hold us to
the law, whether they be public or private bodies, are so often lined up in support of
our losing the right to do the same to them.
V.
Law is inevitably complex, time-consuming, and expensive. All law belongs to one
legal system or another, and navigating the system is a hard job. Every occasion on
which law is invoked is an occasion for more law to be invoked. To use law in
doing justice, and indeed to use law satisfactorily in most other ways, requires a
kind of expertise which is expensive to acquire and maintain. It also requires time,
energy and focus which not all have at their disposal. Every legal system beyond the
most fledgling therefore comes with its assembled brigades of legal practitioners,
whose principal task is to mediate between the law and its end-users: to sift,
analyze, distill, and integrate points of law and legally relevant material, and to
manage legal processes. Dispensing with lawyers while attempting to use the law,
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especially in court, is often a false economy.2 It wastes judicial time, prolongs
negotiations, compounds misunderstandings, and aggravates disputes. All of this is
well-known and of course much bemoaned by people who willingly pay much more
over the odds for their fancy holidays, new cars, and cosmetic dentistry.
To be a legal practitioner not only requires special skills. It also requires
moral virtues, or at least the ability to emulate them. Minimally, it requires a certain
moral sensibility in which questions of justice are foregrounded. Habituation in
respect of that sensibility is built into any serious legal education. It helps to explain
why a law student should read the cases and not make do with a second-hand
account, in a headnote or textbook, of which legal doctrines they stand for. Mastery
of legal doctrines is not all that he or she is supposed to take away. He or she is also
supposed to develop a sense of what it takes to argue and decide a case in a way that
is consonant with what the Bar Model Code of ethics, in the United States, nicely
calls the lawyer's 'special responsibility for the quality of justice'.29 To practice law
is not to be a judge but it is, in this respect, to think and act like one.
In this paper, however, I have tried to remind you that this is not enough.
Arbitrators too have a mission to do justice between the parties. To that extent they
too must share the moral sensibility of a lawyer. That, indeed, is why many of them
are lawyers. But arbitrators do not act, when they arbitrate, with the whole moral
mission of lawyers. As arbitrators, they lack the extra task of growing and
protecting the wider culture of legality. Lawyers working as lawyers - as legal
professionals - have that additional task, which they owe only to the public good.
A lawyer is, as the Bar Model Code of ethics also says, 'an officer of the legal
system and a public citizen'. 30 And that, as the Code hints but does not quite say, is
capable of conflicting with her role as 'a representative of clients'. 3 1 Her mind
cannot only be on the interests of her client, or on doing justice for her client, or
even on doing justice full stop, without also harbouring potentially inhibiting
thoughts about whether she is doing justice according to law, ie, in a way consonant
with respect for the rule of law.
In the brief quarter century since I qualified as a barrister, the way that legal
practitioners are conceived in the public policy and public culture of the west, and
possibly of the world, has changed dramatically. Where lawyers were once thought
of as professionals they are now thought of as service-providers. 3 2 If they are still
referred to as professionals, that is probably because we have forgotten what
distinguishes a professional and use the word for every white-collar worker. But a
professional has a higher calling. She is the servant of nobody in particular, not
28 See the comments of Black LJ and Aiken LJ in Lindner v Rawlins [2015] EWCA Civ
61.
29 American Bar Association, Model Rules of Professional Conduct 2017 Edition
(2017) 1 ('Model Rules').
30 Ibid 2.
31 Ibid.
32 In the UK, big changes in this direction were effected and reflected in the Courts and
Legal Services Act 1990 (UK) and the Legal Services Act 2007 (UK).
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even a succession of different people. She may incidentally provide a service to
someone, but it is never just a service to that someone. For she has wider
responsibilities.
Some people suppose that we will continue to think of lawyers as
professionals in this wider-responsibility way so long as we continue to recognize
them as having moral tasks, and in particular 'a special responsibility for the quality
of justice'. 33 However, that particular moral task is fairly easily integrated into the
contemporary service-provider model. Getting justice for them, or at least getting
them access to justice, is, we might want to say, the main service we aim to provide
to our clients. Much harder to integrate into the service-provider model, however, is
our special responsibility, as lawyers, for upholding the rule of law. That is because
the rule of law is for the most part a public good in which our clients may well have
relatively little individual interest. In respect of our role in protecting that public
good, fortunately, we are not beholden to our clients or to anyone else. We answer,
in this respect, only to the law. In this respect, we are professionals, not service
providers.
Andrew Dickson White, who founded Cornell Law School, hoped thereby to
furnish 'lawyers in the best sense'.34 Lawyers in the best sense are those that serve
law in the best sense, and law in the best sense is not the law that we associate with
juridification - the proliferation and increasing pervasiveness of legal norms and
legally-recognized norms - but rather the law that we associate with the climate of
legality, with living under the rule of law. Today's young lawyers, faced with new
assaults upon that climate of the kind I have tried to describe in this paper, have a
'special responsibility for the quality of justice'3 going beyond any that the original
drafters of the Bar Model Code of ethics could have anticipated. For they face a
world more hostile to legality, and yet more wedded to juridification, than any we
have seen before. Will they be up to the challenge?
33 Model Rules 1.
34 Andrew Dickson White, What Profession Shall I Choose, and How Shall I Fit Myself
for It? (1884) 38.
35 Model Rules 1.
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